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This paper provides new insights into the way in which the capital
structure and market power and capital structure and proﬁtability are
related. We used sample data of fourteen banks listed on the Amman
Stock Exchange for the period from 2005 to 2008.W ee x a m i n et h ed e -
pendent variable, which are expressed by total debt deﬂated by total
assets, while theindependentvariablesare TobinQ,Growth, Proﬁtabil-
ity, Size, Ownership, Risk and Tangibility ratio. The ols estimation re-
sults indicate that, at lower and higher ranges of Tobin’s Q,b a n k se m -
ploy higher debt, and reduce their debt at intermediate range. This is
due to the complex interaction of market conditions, agency costs, and
bankruptcy costs. We also show the saucer-shaped relation between
capital structure and proﬁtability because of the interplay of agency
costs, costs of external ﬁnancing and interest tax-shield. We ﬁnd that
size tangibility variables have a positive inﬂuence both on capital struc-
ture and on the other hand on growth, while risk and ownership vari-
ables have a negative inﬂuence on capital structure.
Key Words: knowledge, competitiveness, ﬁrm performance,
knowledge-based theory
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Introduction
Capital structure decisions are crucial for the ﬁnancial wellbeing of the
ﬁrm.Financialdistress,liquidationandbankruptcyaretheultimatecon-
sequences laying ahead if any major misjudgment occurred following
any ﬁnancing decision of the ﬁrm’s activity. One of the strategies a ﬁrm
should look into is to lower the weighted cost of capital. This will in-
crease net economic return, which eventually increases the ﬁrm’s value.
Hence, maximizing the ﬁrm’s value is the focal point for every ﬁnancing
decision made by the management of the company. The management of
the ﬁrm operating in the very uncertain world has a tough task ahead in
achieving the best capital structure.
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However, the key to choosing an appropriate and acceptable level of
ﬁnancial leverage is still debatable by the top management of a ﬁrm.
Many theories and much empirical evidence in providing optimal capi-
tal structure exist in the real world. Yet, this is still a cloudy area andwith
no speciﬁc guidelines to assist ﬁnancial oﬃcers in attaining an eﬃcient
mixture of debt and equity. Thus, only clues and calculated judgment
plus some understanding of ﬁnancial theory are possible tools to be ap-
plied in facilitating how the ﬁnancing mix aﬀects the ﬁrm’s value and its
stock price.
There are some studies that provide evidence on the capital structure
determinants from the emerging markets of South-east Asia (Pandey
2001; Pandey et al. 2000; Annuar and Shamsher 1993;A r i ﬀ 1998). The
focus of corporate ﬁnance empirical literature has been to identify some
‘stylised’ factors that determine capital structure. Modigliani and Miller
(1958) initiated the theory of capitalstructure in their inﬂuentialseminal
work on the eﬀects of capital structure on the ﬁrm’s value. They demon-
strate and ﬁnally conclude that the ‘capital structure is an irrelevance’ in
a perfect ﬁnancialmarket, considering the no-tax case in the ‘pie model,’
which literally means that the ﬁrm’s value is independent of its ﬁnanc-
ing or ﬁnancial structure. They argue that the size of the pie does not
depend on how it is sliced, but depends only on the level and risk of
its future cash ﬂows. Modigliani and Miller (1963) even illustrate how
ﬁrms should utilize ‘all’ debt ﬁnancing,because interest is deductible for
tax purpose. This ‘tax shield’ allows ﬁrms to pay lower taxes than they
should if equity ﬁnancing is used, thus attaining optimal capital struc-
ture through tax saving. Surprisingly, despite all the criticism and con-
troversial issues arising from the m&m proposition, the empirical work
byHatﬁeld,Cheng,andDavidson(1994)supportsthe m&m theorem. As
time moved on, and with recent developments in the corporate world,
more researches have examined in greater depth the concept of capital
structure.
The trade-oﬀ theory of capital structure comes at a later stage, which
is concerned about the corporate ﬁnance choices of ﬁrms, and is widely
discussed. Its rationale is to describe the fact that ﬁrms are usually ﬁ-
nanced by some proportion of debt and equity. It proposes the principle
that a ﬁrm’s target leverage is driven by tax-shields, bankruptcy costs of
debt and agency conﬂicts. Under the trade-oﬀ theory, it aﬃrms the ad-
vantages of using debt because the ﬁrm can gain a tax shield by using
some proportionofdebt in ﬁnancingthe company.The tax shield comes
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fromthe interest payment asa tax deductible item, which meansthat the
higher theinterest paymentondebtemployed,thelowerwill bethe taxes
paid by the ﬁrm. However, as companies decide to use more debt, this
will put companies in the position of ﬁnancial distress due to the pos-
sibility of the ﬁrm being in default in meeting its liabilities obligations.
Financial distress will include bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy cost. In
conclusion, the trade-oﬀ theory suggests that optimal capital structure
can be attained. However, ﬁrms should take appropriate actions in bal-
ancing between the tax beneﬁts of higher debt and the greater possibility
of ﬁnancial distress costs, while aiming to optimize their overall value.
Early empirical evidence on the trade-oﬀ theory by Bradley, Jarrel, and
Kim (1984) reported mixed result.
Debt is an eﬀective tool to lessen the agency costs, and eventually op-
timalcapital structure can be derivedfromthe balancebetween the costs
of debt against the beneﬁts of debt. In viewing the conﬂicts between
shareholders and bondholders, covenants will protect the bondholders’
position so that they can mitigate the risk of default payment. However,
the agency costs onlyarise when the risk of defaults paymentexists. Even
though the agency costs of debt are burdensome, they are the solution
towards obtaining external funds at a lower rate. The choice of capital
structure brings signals to outside investors through the information of
insiders. Ross (1977) assumes that managers (the insiders) know the true
distribution ofﬁrms’ returns, butinvestorsdonot.Ifmanagersdecide to
add more debt into capital structure, investors interpret this as a signal
of high future cash ﬂows and the ﬁrm is committed towards its contrac-
tual obligation. Thus, this will show a higher level of conﬁdence that the
managementhastowardstheﬁrm’sprospectinthenearfuture.However,
if managers decide to ﬁnance the ﬁrm by issuing new equity, this signals
thatmanagementislackinginconﬁdencetowardsfutureprospectsofthe
ﬁrm. Accordingly, it concludes that investors take larger levels of debt as
asignal of higher qualityandthat proﬁtabilityandleverageare thus pos-
itively related. The ﬁrst and foremost purpose of the present study is to
determine the relationship between capital structure and market power.
This will clarify the extent of optimal debt and equity used in ﬁnancing
the ﬁrms’ activity in emerging markets, such as the Jordanian one. This
study explains the relation between capital structure and market struc-
ture andthe relation between capitalstructure andproﬁtability,and also
sheds light on the Jordaniancapitalstructure area andhow to lead the ﬁ-
nancialmanagersindeterminingtherightchoicesinthecapitalstructure
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policy in the future. The mainhypotheses ofthis study canbedeveloped:
h1 There is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of Tobin Q on capital struc-
ture.
h2 There is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of proﬁtability on capital
structure.
h3 There is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of growth on capital struc-
ture.
h4 There is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of unsystematic risk on cap-
ital structure,
h5 There is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of asset size on capital struc-
ture.
h6 There is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of tangibility on capital
structure.
h7 There is no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of ownership on capital
structure.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows: the sec-
ond provides the theoretical framework, the third section presents a re-
view of empirical studies, the fourth section describes data and research
methodology, the ﬁfth section reports on the results of the statistical
analyses, and the last summarizes the main conclusions and recommen-
dations of the study.
TheoreticalFramework
theories of capital structure
Modigliani and Miller (1958) initiated the theory of capital structure
in their inﬂuential seminal work on the eﬀects of capital structure on
the ﬁrm’s value. They demonstrate and ﬁnally conclude that the ‘capital
structure is an irrelevance’ in a perfect ﬁnancial market, considering the
no-tax case in the ‘pie model,’ which literally means that the ﬁrm’s value
is independentofits ﬁnancingor ﬁnancialstructure. They argue that the
size of the pie does not depend on how it is sliced, but depends only on
the level and risk of its future cash ﬂows.
Hatﬁeld, Cheng, and Davidson (1994) support the m&m theorem.
As time has moved on,and with recent developments in the corporate
world, more researches have examined more deeply the concept of cap-
ital structure. The trade-oﬀ theory of capital structure comes at a later
stage, which is concerned about the corporate ﬁnance choices of ﬁrms
and is widely discussed. Its rationale is to describe the fact that ﬁrms are
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usually ﬁnanced by some proportion of debt and equity. It proposes the
principle that a ﬁrm’s target leverage is driven by tax shields, bankruptcy
costs of debt and agency conﬂicts.
Agencycostisalsoanimportantissueindeterminingthecapitalstruc-
tureofaﬁrm.Itarisesduetotheconﬂictofinterestbetweenshareholders
and managers, or between shareholders and bondholder managers, who
aregiventheauthoritybytheshareholders tomanagetheﬁrm,ontheas-
sumption that managers will act in the interest of the ﬁrm’s welfare and
shareholders’ beneﬁts (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, the agency
costs only arise when the risk of defaults payment exists. Even though
the agency costs of debt are burdensome, they are the solution towards
obtaining external funds at a lower rate. The choice of capital structure
brings signals to outside investors through the information of insiders.
Ross(1977) assumes that managers(the insiders) knowthe truedistribu-
tion ofthe ﬁrm’s returns, butinvestors do not.If managers decide to add
more debt into the capital structure, investors interpret this as a signal
of high future cash ﬂows, and the ﬁrm is committed towards its contrac-
tual obligation. Thus, this will show the higher-level of conﬁdence the
management has towards the ﬁrm’s prospects in the near future.
However,ifmanagersdecideto ﬁnancethe ﬁrmbyissuing newequity,
this signals that management is lacking in conﬁdence towards the future
prospects of the ﬁrm. Accordingly, it concludes that the investors take
larger levels of debt as a signal of higher quality, and that proﬁtability
and leverage are thus positively related.
The Pecking Order theory was ﬁrst initiated by Myers (1984) and My-
ersandMajluf(1984).Thetheory triestocapturethecostsofasymmetric
information and assumes that the management of the company knows
more about the future prospects of the ﬁrms than do outsiders. It makes
the announcement to issue debt or equity meaningful to outsiders, as it
is a signal of managementprospects in the future. The market will give a
positive reaction if the company starts to buyback its shares. To sum up,
the pecking order theory tries to generate ideas that ﬁrms will use the
hierarchy of ﬁnancing. Firstly, they will tend to use internal funds, oth-
erwise, if not adequate, they will ﬁnance with external funds and with
debt. That will make equity for the last resort in ﬁnancing the capital
structure of the company.
banks and capital structure
The standard competitive paradigm, that less competition leads to mar-
ket power (Bain 1956), may not be appropriate for the banking indus-
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try. Due to the asymmetric information inherent in bank lending, bank-
ing competition may have a ‘special nature.’ Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
showthat asymmetricinformationmaycausecredit rationing.However,
Bester (1985) contests this result and suggests that credit-rationing prob-
lems can be circumvented when banks compete by choosing collateral
requirements and using the interest rate to screen the risk to borrow-
ers. Furthermore, De Meza and Webb (2007) state that the conditions
needed for credit rationing to occur are too stringent. This suggests that,
irrespective of the market structure, rationing can occur. Banks face an
adverse selection problemandhave to screen ﬁrmswhen they give loans.
Conditional on the outcome of this screening, banks compete with each
other by setting a loan rate. This procedure reduces the adverse selection
problem, but it does not completely eliminate it if the screening tests
are imperfect (Broecker 1990). Price competition and independent test
procedures create a negative externality. Setting a higher loan rate than
competitors produces two opposite eﬀects on the proﬁt of the deviating
bank.
On the one hand, higher lending rates increase proﬁts.On the other
hand, they worsen the quality of ﬁrms accepting the loan, thus reduc-
ing proﬁts. A ﬁrm will accept the least favorable loan rate only after
being rejected by all other banks setting more favorable rates; but this
implies that the ﬁrm has a low credit-worthiness on average. Because of
this ‘winner’s curse’ problem, increasing the number of banks perform-
ing screening tests decreases the average creditworthiness of ﬁrms, and
increases the probability that a bank does not grant any loan. Conse-
quently, equilibrium loan rates converge to oligopolist levels and banks
end up making positive proﬁts even with pure price competition. This
implies that less bank market concentration may lead to high interest
rates and less ﬁrm ﬁnancing from banks
Petersen and Rajan (1995) investigate the eﬀect of competition be-
tween banks on the availability of bank credit to ﬁrms. The Petersen and
Rajanmodelshowshowespecially ﬁrmswithuncertainfuturecashﬂows
are negatively aﬀected by competition between banks.Banks may be un-
willingto investinrelationshipsbyincurringinitiallossesthatmaynever
be recouped in the future (as ﬁrms can later on obtain a low loan rate in
a competitive banking or ﬁnancial market). Marquez (2002)a l s oﬁ n d s
that more low-quality borrowers obtain ﬁnancing, and banks may have
to increase loan rates to compensate for the higher portfolio risk, thus
leading to an inverse relationship between competition and the level of
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loan rates. This result may not obtain any longer, however, when infor-
mation acquisition is endogenous.
In such a context, competition lowers loan rates, in the usual way.
Hauswald and Marquez (2005) show that when banks acquire informa-
tion to soften competition and increase market shares, a higher num-
ber of banks reduces the winner’s curse problem originating from com-
petitors’ superior information, thus leading to lower loan rates. In other
words, an increase in the number of competing banks reduces the de-
gree of product diﬀerentiation among banks, and thus loan rates. Fur-
thermore, the theoretical literature has identiﬁed several problems with
relationship banking. There is potential for a hold-up problem (Sharpe
1990; Rajan1992), whereby a relationship bank may use the superior pri-
vate information it possesses about the ﬁrm in order to extract rents. As
a result, theory oﬀers contradicting predictions on the relationship be-
tween bank market structure and ﬁrms’ capital structure. Therefore we
distinguish between two hypotheses: the information-based hypothesis
and the market power hypothesis.
Review ofEmpirical Studies
There are a few empirical studies that have investigated the issue of cap-
ital structure and market structure using data of the us ﬁrms. In these
studies, market structure has been measured either in terms of price or
quantitydataortheLernerindexortheHerﬁndahl-Hirschmanindex,or
Tobin’s Q. Krishnaswamy, Mangla, and Rathinasamy (1992) ﬁnd a posi-
tive relation between debt andmarket structure, measured by the Lerner
index. Chevalier (1993) provides evidence in support of a negative rela-
tionbetween capitalstructureandmarketstructure. Thisresultisconsis-
tent with bankruptcy costs or the asymmetric information/pecking or-
der hypotheses. Phillips (1995), using price and quantity data for mar-
ket structure, ﬁnds a positive link between capital structure and market
structure, consistent with the output and limited liability eﬀect model.
In a study of internationalﬁrms from forty-ninecountries, Rathnasamy,
Krishnaswamy, and Mantripragada(2000) also report a positive relation
betweencapitalstructure,measuredbytotaldebtratioandlong-termra-
tio and market structure measured by Tobin’s Q. Their ﬁnding supports
the output and limited liability eﬀect and agency theoretic risk-shifting
model of capital structure and product market interaction. The results
also provide support for the free cash ﬂow model of Jensen (1986),in the
form of a positive relation between capital structure and proﬁtability.
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In empirical studies of determinants of capital structure, the Tobin Q
ratio has also been used as a proxy for future investment opportunities.
These studies show mixed results. A number of studies conﬁrm a neg-
ative relationship between Q ratio and debt ratio (Titman and Wessels
1988;Barclay et al. 1995;L a s f e r1995; RajanandZingales 1995; Barclayand
Smith 1996), while some ﬁnd a positive relation (Michaelas et al. 1999).
Faulkender and Petersen (2006,h e n c e f o r t hfp) argue that informa-
tion asymmetry and investment distortions are the market frictions that
make capital structure choices relevant, but also imply that ﬁrms are
sometimes rationed by their lenders. Thus, when estimating a ﬁrm’s
leverage, it is important to include not only the determinants of its pre-
ferred leverage (the demandside) but also the variables that measure the
constraints on a ﬁrm’s ability to increase its leverage (the supply side).
Pratomo and Ismail (2006), study the Islamic bank performance and
capital structure based on 15 Malaysia Islamic Banks’ Annual Report
from 1997 until 2004. They consider the choice between debt and eq-
uity ﬁnancing that has been directed to seek the optimal capital struc-
ture. Under the agency costs hypothesis, a high leverage tends to have
an optimal capital structure and therefore it leads to producing a good
performance, while the Modigliani-Miller theorem proves that it has no
eﬀect on the value of the ﬁrm. The importance of these issues has only
motivated researches toexaminethe presenceof agencycostsin the non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms. In ﬁnancial ﬁrms, agency costs may also be particularly
large because banks are by their very nature informationally opaque –
holding private information on their loan customers and other credit
counterparties. In addition, there are regulators that set minimums for
equity capital and other types of regulatory capital in order to deter ex-
cessive risk taking and perhaps aﬀecting agency cost hypothesis of Is-
lamic Banks in Malaysia, under which a high leverage ﬁrm tends to re-
duce the agency costs. They set the proﬁt eﬃciency of a bank as an in-
dicator of reducing agency costs and the ratio equity of a bank as an
indicator of leverage. Their ﬁndings are consistent with the agency hy-
pothesis. The higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is associated
with higher proﬁt eﬃciency.
Pandey (2004) examines the relationship between capital structure
and market structure using data from 208 Malaysian companies for the
period from 1994 to 2000. This study provides new insights into the way
in which capital structure and market power and capital structure and
proﬁtabilityarerelated.Capitalstructureandmarketpower,asmeasured
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by Tobin’s Q, are shown to have a cubic relationship, due to the com-
plex interaction of market conditions, agency problems and bankruptcy
costs. The study ﬁnds a saucer-shaped relation between capital structure
and proﬁtability, due to the interplay of agency costs, costs of external
ﬁnancing and debt tax shield
Bevan and Danbolt (2004) analyze the determinants of the capital
structure of 1,054 uk companies from 1991 to 1997, and the extent to
which the inﬂuence of these determinants is aﬀected by time-invariant
ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity. Comparing the results of pooled ols and
ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimation, they ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
results. While their ols results are generally consistent with the prior
literature, the results of their ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimation contradict
many of the traditional theories of the determinants of corporate ﬁnan-
cial structure. This suggests that the results of traditional studies may
be biased owing to a failure to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-invariant
heterogeneity.
Drobetz and Fix (2003) have tested leverage predictions of the trade-
oﬀ and pecking order models using Swiss data. At an aggregate level, the
leverage of Swiss ﬁrms is comparatively low, but the results depend cru-
ciallyontheexactdeﬁnitionofleverage.Byconﬁrmingthepeckingorder
model but contradicting the trade-oﬀ model, more proﬁtable ﬁrms use
less leverage. Firms with more investmentopportunities apply less lever-
age, which supports both the trade-oﬀ model and a complex version of
thepeckingordermodel.Leverageisverycloselyrelatedtothetangibility





The sample data used in the study are for the four year period from 2005
through 2008. We exclude the fourteen banks whichtraded the stock of
bank on the Amman Stock Exchange (ase). The data for the empirical
analysis were derived from the ﬁnancial statements of these banks.
The estimation equation is as follows:
(td/a)i,t = α0 + α1Qi,t + α2(ebit/a) + α3gai,t + α4βi,t
+ α5logai,t + α6tani,t + α7owsi,t + αi,t.
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Total debt-to-asset ratio (td/a) at book value is our dependent vari-
able. Independent variables include Q ratio, proﬁtability, growth, unsys-
tematic risk, size, ownership (number of shares) and tangibility. Q is
calculated as the sum of the market value of equity and book value of
long-term debt and net current assets (current assets minus current lia-
bilities). Growth (ga) is measured as one plus annual change in assets.
Proﬁtability (ebit/a) is deﬁned as earnings before interest and taxes di-
vided byassets orcapital.Risk is deﬁnedassystematic risk, andit is mea-
sured by unleveredbeta. Beta foreach ﬁrmis calculated using the weekly
share price data. The calculated beta for each company is unlevered for
its level of leverage. Size is measured as the natural log of assets. Owner-
ship (ows) is measured by the natural log of the number of outstanding
shares. Itisassumedthatalargernumberofsharesimpliesdiﬀused own-
ership. Tangibility (tan)i sd e ﬁ n e da sﬁ x e da s s e t sd i v i d e db ya s s e t s .
The relationship between ﬁrm proﬁtability and capital structure can
be explained by the pecking order theory (pot), which holds that ﬁrms
prefer internal sources of ﬁnance to external sources. The order of the
preference is from the one that is least sensitive (and least risky) to the
onethatismostsensitive(andmostrisky),whicharisesbecauseofasym-
metric information between corporate insiders and less well-informed
marketparticipants(Myers2001).Bythis token,proﬁtableﬁrmswith ac-
cesstoretainedproﬁtscanrelyonthemasopposedtodependingonout-
side sources (debt). Murinde et al. (2004)observe that retentions are the
principal source of ﬁnance. Titman and Wessels (1988)a g r e et h a tﬁ r m s
with high proﬁt rates, all things being equal, would maintain relatively
lower debt ratios since they are ableto generate such funds frominternal
sources.
Empirical evidence from previous studies seems to be consistent with
the pecking order theory. Most studies found a negative relationship be-
tween proﬁtability and capital structure. Hall et al. (2004) also suggest
negativerelationshipsbetween proﬁtabilityandbothlong-termdebtand
short-term debt ratios.
Firm growth is likely to place a greater demand on internally gener-
ated funds and push the ﬁrm into borrowing (Hall et al. 2004). Firms
with high growth will capture relatively higher debt ratios. In the case of
small ﬁrms with more concentrated ownership, it is expected that high
growth ﬁrms will require more external ﬁnancing and should display
higher leverage. (Heshmati 2001) maintain that growing smes appear
more likely to use external ﬁnance – although it is diﬃcult to determine
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whether ﬁnanceinducesgrowthorthe opposite(orboth).Asenterprises
grow through diﬀerentstages, i.e., micro, small,mediumandlargescale,
they are also expected to shift ﬁnancing sources.
They are ﬁrst expected to move from internal sources to external
sources. There is also a relationship between the degree of previous
growth and future growth. Michaelas et al. (1999) argue that future op-
portunities will be positively related to leverage, in particular short term
leverage.
Firm risk showing the level of risk is said to be one of the primary
determinants of a ﬁrm’s capital structure. The tax shelter-bankruptcy
cost theory of capital structure determines a ﬁrm’s optimal leverage as a
function of business risk (Castanias1983). Given agency and bankruptcy
costs, there are incentives for the ﬁrm not to fully utilize the tax beneﬁts
of 100% debt within the static framework model.
The more likely a ﬁrm is exposed to such costs, the greater is their in-
centive to reduce their level of debt within its capital structure. One ﬁrm
variable that aﬀects this exposure is the ﬁrm’s operating risk, in that the
more volatile the ﬁrm’s earnings stream, the greater is the chance of the
ﬁrm defaulting and being exposed to such costs. According to Johnson
(1997), ﬁrms with more volatile earnings growth may experience more
situations in which cash ﬂows are too low for debt service.
Despite the broad consensus that ﬁrm risk is an important determi-
nant of corporate debt policy, empirical investigation has led to contra-
dictory results. Esperança et al. (2003) found positive associations be-
tween ﬁrm risk and both long-term and short-term debt.
Berle andMeans (1932) initiallydevelopedthe agencytheory, andthey
argued that there is an increase in the gap between ownership and con-
trol of large organizations arising from a decrease in equity ownership in
theory, shareholders of a company are the only owners, and the duty of
top management should be solely to ensure that shareholders interests’
are met. In other words, the duty of top managers is to manage the com-
pany in such a way that returns to shareholders are maximized, thereby
increasing the proﬁt ﬁgures and cash ﬂows (Elliot 2002)
The assetstructure (Tangibility)ofa ﬁrmplaysasigniﬁcantrolein de-
termining its capital structure. The de g r e et ow h i c ht h eﬁ r m ’ sa s s e t sa r e
tangible should result in the ﬁrm having greater liquidation value (Tit-
man and Wessels 1988). Bradley et al. (1984) assert that ﬁrms that invest
heavily in tangible assets also have higher ﬁnancial leverage since they
borrow at lower interest rates if their debt is secured with such assets. It
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is believed that debt may be more readily used if there are durable as-
sets to serve as collateral (Wedig et al. 1988). It is further suggested that
bank ﬁnancing will depend upon whether the lending can be secured by
tangible assets (Berger and Udell 1998).
Empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship consistent with
theoretical argument between asset structure and leverage for the ﬁrms
(Bradley et al. 1984) Wedig et al. (1988),however, found a signiﬁcant and
negativecoeﬃcientbetweendepreciationexpenseasapercentageoftotal
assets and ﬁnancial leverage. Other studies speciﬁcally suggest a positive
relationship between asset structure and long-term debt, and a negative
relationship between asset structure and short-term debt.
Dataand MainEmpirical Results
The lengths of trade credit terms are directly related to market power,
as more valuable customers can negotiate more generous credit terms
with suppliers. In addition, bankswith agreater marketshare canstretch
the credit terms oﬀered by suppliers with little repercussion, as contracts
withindustryleadersarecriticaltotheviabilityofsmallersuppliers.Sim-
ilarly, strong relationships with vendors allow banks with greater market
powertohold fewerinventories.Suppliers withmoremarketpowerrela-
tive to customers can negotiate shorter terms with customers for at least
two reasons.
First, the level of competition from rival banks is reduced for banks
with a large market share, which decreases the likelihood of losing cus-
tomers over a reduction in credit terms. Second, suppliers with a large
market share are more likely to have forged longer relationships with
clients, implying high costs of switching suppliers.
We deﬁne market structure in terms of the market power of banks.
Market power means control of a bank over price or volume of produc-
tion. In operational terms, market power implies a ﬁrm’s monopoly,
or oligopoly or competitive power. Rathnasamy, Krishnaswamy and
Mantripragada(2000)statethatmarketstructure(power)couldbemea-
sured by the Lerner index, or the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index, or To-
bin’s Q. Lindenberg and Ross (1981)s h o wt h a tT o b i n ’ sQ (or simply Q)
is a theoretically sound and practically the most powerful indicator of
a ﬁrm’s market power. In a competitive market, Q of all ﬁrms will be
equal to one. Firms with Q higher than one are expected to command
the competitive advantage, either oligopoly or monopoly power.
Hence, we deﬁne market power in terms of Q. There is also a practical
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reasonforusingthisdeﬁnitionofmarketpower.Indevelopingcountries,
price and quantity or segmental data are not available for measuring the
Lerner index or the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index. The theoretical deﬁ-
nition of Q is the ratio of market valueof the ﬁrm to replacement cost of
assets. It is not easy to get replacement cost data in developingcountries.
Table 1 provides means and standard deviations of the dependent and
independent variables for each year from 2005 to 2008 and for the whole
period. The average total debt ratio (tdr) for the period of 2005–2008
is .83.H o w e v e r ,tdr has been steadily increasing over the years, rang-
ing from .79 to .85 from 2005 to 2008. Q ratio has shown ﬂuctuations
during 2005–2008. It was lower in 2007 and 2008, corresponding with
the ﬁnancial and stock market crisis in Jordan, the results indicate 3.30–
2.0–.83–1.57–2.25 respectively. Assets growth was quite high for the years
from 2005–2008; but it showed a sharp decline in the last three years.
Proﬁtability also steadily declined signiﬁcantly in 2006 and 2007.
Tables 2–6providecorrelationRforthesampleof15banks.Theresults
indicatethat size andQratio have a signiﬁcant positive relationship with
totaldebt ratio,whilerisk (unleveredbeta)andproﬁtabilityebit/a have
a signiﬁcant negative relationship in year 2005,b u ti ny e a r2006 the asset
growths have a signiﬁcant negative relationship. The negative relation-
ship between risk and size implies that the large banks, being more di-
versiﬁed,have alower systematicrisk andalsoa negative signiﬁcant rela-
tionshipof proﬁtandsigniﬁcantpositive relationship ofQratio. There is
a positive signiﬁcant relationship between size, and growth in year 2008
with total debt ratio, and negative with risk and tangibility.
Table 2 presents the results for 2005, and the main concern is to test
the speciﬁcation about the relationship between capital structure (total
debt ratio) and market power. We ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant rela-
tionship between Q ratio, proﬁtability and asset size at signiﬁcant level
10%( s i g .. 09, t-test 1.824), 1%( s i g .. 000, t-test –5.016) and 5%( s i g .. 032,
t-test 2.397) respectively, and the results indicate that the total indepen-
dent variables are at a signiﬁcant level of 5%( s i g .. 019, F-test .019), and
the coeﬃcient are signiﬁcantat 1% level of signiﬁcance. We interpret this
evidence as consistent with the economic theory of output maximiza-
tion and ﬁnance theories of agency costs and bankruptcy costs. For a
given initial range of Q ratio, any increase in this ratio leads ﬁrms to
increase output and take more risks to maximize shareholders wealth.
This causes rivalry in the market, and competition intensiﬁes, particu-
larly from unlevered ﬁrms. The fear of bankruptcy and loss of invest-
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table 1 Descriptive Statistics for (Q, Growth, Proﬁtability, Asset Size, Ownership,
Risk, Tangibility, td/ta) in Every Year and in Overall Years
(1)( 2)( 3)( 4)( 5)( 6)( 7)( 8)( 9)( 10)
2005 Mean 3.30 1.05 .036 8.92 7.39 .032 .60 0.85
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Std. dev. 1.12 2.86 .017 .51 .24 .018 .14 0.09
Min. 1.65 .001 .02 8.06 7.38 .01 .40 0.55
Max. 5.99 11.37 .08 10.20 8.25 .08 .79 0.95
2006 Mean 2.0 .87 .025 9.06 7.85 .08 .75 .79
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Std. dev. .67 2.72 .012 .59 .31 .16 .22 .20
Min. 1.12 .04 .001 8.14 7.38 .001 .06 .09
Max. 3.99 10.71 .06 10.38 .55 .62 .94 .92
2007 Mean .85 .06 .024 9.04 7.91 .024 .81 .85
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Std. dev. .05 .28 .014 .52 .30 .011 .08 .05
Min. 1.23 .36 .01 8.11 7.38 .01 .59 .69
Max. 4.14 .90 .07 10.38 .55 .04 .98 .95
2008 Mean 1.57 .07 .04 9.07 .7.69 .08 .87 .84
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Std. dev. .45 .08 .06 .54 .31 .25 .13 .07
Min. .90 .12 .01 8.06 7.38 .01 .44 .63
Max. 2.42 .24 .26 10.40 8.73 1.01 .04 .92
2005–8 Mean 2.25 .51 .031 9.02 7.85 .05 .76 .83
N 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Std. dev. 1.01 .98 .033 .53 .30 .14 .18 .12
Min. .90 .90 .001 8.06 7.38 .001 .06 .09
Max. 5.99 11.37 .26 10.40 8.73 1.01 .04 .95
notes Column headings are as follows:(1)y e ar ,( 2)i n d e x ,( 3) Q,( 4)g r o w t h ,( 5)p r o f -
itability, (6) asset-size, (7)o wn e r s h i p ,( 8)t a n g i b i l i t y ,( 9)r i s k ,( 10) td/ta.
ment and proﬁtability obliges levered ﬁrms to reduce debt. Hence, for
some intermediate range of Q, the competition forces levered ﬁrms to
lessen debt.
Finally, for well-established, proﬁtable ﬁrms with a very high Q ra-
tio and low probability of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy, the output
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table 2 Regression Analysis of the Relationship between Capital Structure and
Market Power (2005)
(1)( 2)( 3)( 4)( 5)( 6)( 7)( 8)( 9)( 10)
2005 R .451 .130 .812 .554 .289 .126 .213 .920
R2 .204 .017 .659 .306 .083 .016 .045 .847
Adj. R2 .143 –.059 .633 .253 .013 –.060 –.028 .693
Sig. .091*. 645 .000*** .032** .296 .654 .445 .019*
F- t e s t —— –———— 5.518
T-test 1.824 .471 –5.016 2.397 1.088 –.458 -.787 —
β .451 .130 –.8112 .554 .289 –.126 –.213 —
notes Dependent variable: Total Debt Deﬂated by Total Assets. Column headings are
asfollows:(1)year ,(2)index,(3)Q,(4)growth,(5)proﬁtability,(6)asset-size,(7)owner -
ship,(8)risk,(9)tangibility ,(10)total.*Signiﬁcantatp < 0.10.**Signiﬁcantatp < 0.05.
***Signiﬁcant at p < 0.01.
table 3 Regression Analysis of the Relationship between Capital Structure and
Market Power (2006)
(1)( 2)( 3)( 4)( 5)( 6)( 7)( 8)( 9)( 10)
2006 R .171 .933 .202 .353 .015 .307 .136 .994
R2 .029 .870 .041 .124 .000 .095 .019 .989
Adj. R2 –0.46 .860 –0.033 .057 –.077 .025 –.057 .977
Sig. .543 .000*** .471 .198 .958 .265 .628 .000***
F- t e s t ——————— 87.691
T-test .624 –9.343 –.742 –1.358 –0.053 –1.165 .496 —
β .171 –.931 –.202 –.353 –.015 –.307 .136 —
notes Dependent variable: Total Debt Deﬂated by Total Assets. Column headings are
asfollows:(1)year ,(2)index,(3)Q,(4)growth,(5)proﬁtability,(6)asset-size,(7)owner -
ship,(8)risk,(9)tangibility ,(10)total.*Signiﬁcantatp < 0.10.**Signiﬁcantatp < 0.05.
***Signiﬁcant at p < 0.01.
maximization seems to dominate the relation between capital structure
and Q ratio.
Table 3 for year 2006 shows a signiﬁcant relationship between the
growth and capital structure at 1%( s i g .. 000, t-test –9.943) and a signiﬁ-
cantrelationship between allindependentvariablesandcapitalstructure
at 1%( s i g .. 000, F-test 87.691).
Table 4 for year 2007 shows a signiﬁcant relationship between the Q
ratio, proﬁtability and risk and capital structure at diﬀerent levels 10%,
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table 4 Regression Analysis of the Relationship between Capital Structure and
Market Power (2007)
(1)( 2)( 3)( 4)( 5)( 6)( 7)( 8)( 9)( 10)
2007 R .443 .055 .649 .282 .064 .722 .118 .892
R2 .196 .003 .421 .079 .004 .522 .014 .796
Adj. R2 .134 –.074 .377 .009 –0.073 .485 –.062 .591
Sig. .098*. 845 .009*** .309 .821 .002*** .674 .047**
F- t e s t —— –———— 3.895
T-test 1.780 .199 –3.075 1.059 .231 –3.766 –.430 —
β .443 .053 –.649 .282 .064 –.722 –.118 —
notes Dependent variable: Total Debt Deﬂated by Total Assets. Column headings are
asfollows:(1)year ,(2)index,(3)Q,(4)gr o wth,(5)proﬁtability,(6)asset-size,(7)owner -
ship,(8)risk,(9)tangibility ,(10)total.*Signiﬁcantatp < 0.10.**Signiﬁcantatp < 0.05.
***Signiﬁcant at p < 0.01.
table 5 Regression Analysis of the Relationship between Capital Structure and
Market Power (2008)
(1)( 2)( 3)( 4)( 5)( 6)( 7)( 8)( 9)( 10)
2008 R .002 .543 .043 .485 .343 .486 .824 .891
R2 .000 .295 .002 .238 .118 .236 .678 .794
Adj. R2 –.077 .241 –.075 .177 .050 .177 .654 .588
Sig. .995 .036** .878 .067*. 210 .067*. 000*** .048**
F- t e s t —— –———— 3.851
T-test –.006 2.333 –.157 2.002 1.318 –2.002 –5.238 —
β –.002 .543 –.043 .485 .343 –.486 –.824 —
notes Dependent variable: Total Debt Deﬂated by Total Assets. Column headings are
asfollows:(1)year ,(2)index,(3)Q,(4)gr o wth,(5)proﬁtability,(6)asset-size,(7)owner -
ship,(8)risk,(9)tangibility ,(10)total.*Signiﬁcantatp < 0.10.**Signiﬁcantatp < 0.05.
***Signiﬁcant at p < 0.01.
1% and 5% respectively (sig. .098, t-test 1.780;s i g .. 009, t-test –3.075;s i g .
.009, t-test –3.766 ) and a signiﬁcant relationship between all indepen-
dent variables and capital structure at 5%( s i g .. 047, F-test 3.895). Thus,
our results conﬁrm a saucer-shaped relationship between debt ratio and
proﬁtability.
We interpret this evidence as a trade-oﬀ between the eﬀects of asym-
metric information, agency costs and tax beneﬁts. For a given initial
range of proﬁtability, any increase in this ratio leads ﬁrms to internally
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table 6 Regression Analysis of the Relationship between Capital Structure and
Market Power (2005–2008)
(1)( 2)( 3)( 4)( 5)( 6)( 7)( 8)( 9)( 10)
2005–8 R .221 .497 .069 .025 .082 .274 .164 .382
R2 .049 .247 .005 .001 .007 .075 .027 .217
Adj. R2 .032 .234 –.012 –.017 –.010 .059 .010 –.210
Sig. .090*. 000*** .599 .848 .531 .034** .211 .000***
F- t e s t —— –———— 5.396
T-test 1.726 –4.363 –.529 .192 .630 –2.168 –1.266 —
β .221 –.497 –.069 .025 .082 –.274 –.164 —
notes Dependent variable: Total Debt Deﬂated by Total Assets. Column headings are
asfollows:(1)year ,(2)index,(3)Q,(4)growth,(5)proﬁtability,(6)asset-size,(7)owner -
ship,(8)risk,(9)tangibility ,(10)total.*Signiﬁcantatp < 0.10.**Signiﬁcantatp < 0.05.
***Signiﬁcant at p < 0.01.
ﬁnancetheir output growth andminimize the cost ofﬁnancing.It is also
likely that at relatively lower levels of proﬁtability, ﬁrms may not have
much incentive to issue debt, as other non-debt tax shields may be avail-
able to them. There may also exist an intermediate range of proﬁtability
whereﬁrmsdonothavesuﬃcientincentiveeither to increaseordecrease
any further. Finally, at higher levels of proﬁtability and given their mar-
ket power and intensifying competition, ﬁrms will increase borrowing
to expandtheir output. Also, they have more proﬁts to shield from taxes.
Further, agency costs will be higher once ﬁrms reach high levels of prof-
itability.
The coeﬃcients of other control variables are also statistically signiﬁ-
cant. Consistent with the option model of Myers (1977) and the pecking
order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984), our results show a signiﬁ-
cantnegativerelation between growthanddebtratio.Wealsoﬁndaneg-
ative relationship between (systematic) risk and debt ratio. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the trade-oﬀ theory. The positive relation between size
and debt ratio is evidence in favor of the hypotheses that larger ﬁrms
tend to be more diversiﬁed and less prone to bankruptcy, and the trans-
action costs of issuing debt are smaller. The negative relation between
debt ratio and the size of shareholding means that more diﬀused own-
ership results in lower leverage. The result supports the agency hypothe-
sis. The results indicate a signiﬁcant positive relation of tangibility (fa/a
ratio) with debt ratio. These results vindicate the trade-oﬀ theory that
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postulates a positive correlation between debt ratio and tangibility since
ﬁxed assets act as collateral in debt issues.
Table 5 for year 2008 shows that there is a signiﬁcant relationship be-
tween the growth, asset, risk and tangibility and capital structure at dif-
ferent levels 5%, 10% and 1% respectively (sig. .036, t-test 2.333;s i g .. 067,
t-test 2.002;s i g .. 067, t-test -2.002;s i g .. 000, t-test –5.238) and a signiﬁ-
cantrelationship between all independentvariablesandcapitalstructure
at 5%( s i g .. 0487, F-test 3.851). Finally, table 6 contains all periods from
years 2005–2008 and indicates a signiﬁcant relationship between the Q
ratio, growth and risk and capital structure at diﬀerent levels, 10% and
1% respectively (sig. .090, t-test 1.726;s i g .. 000, t-test –4.363;s i g .. 034,
t-test –2.168) and signiﬁcant relationship between all independent vari-
ables and capital structure at 1%( s i g .. 000, F-test 5.396).
Theargumentsof theresults areasfollows.A bankin oligopolycondi-
tion sustains its aggressive production and high-income strategy by em-
ploying a higher level of debt. Shareholders of the bank gain in terms of
increased wealth. In adverse market conditions, the limited liability pro-
vides protection to shareholders against the risky production decision by
which lenders would suﬀer. Thus, the bank’s debt level will increase as it
gains market power reﬂected in Q. On the other hand, as debt increases,
there aresigniﬁcantcostsin termsofincreasedprobabilityofbankruptcy
and ﬁnancial distress. This cost would be accentuated by the behavior of
no or low-debt banks with ‘deep purses.’ They would resort to predatory
price behavior and lead their rivals to bankruptcy. This argument sug-
gests a negative relationship between capital structure and Q.T h e s et w o
opposing eﬀects point to the possibility of a non-linear relationship be-
tween capital structure and market power. As a bank starts gaining mar-
ket dominance, it will increase debt to increase its production and in-
come. That is, as bank’s market power increases, they employ more debt
topursue their outputmaximization strategy. This attractsrivalbanksto
intensifycompetitionbycuttingpriceand/oroutput.Attheintermediate
level of market dominance when competition intensiﬁes through price
cut, higher costs of debt squeeze out the proﬁtability of highly levered
ﬁrms, and their chances of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy increase.
Levered banks react by reducing debt or increasing production through
improved assets utilization. However, after consolidating their position,
banksatahigher levelofmarketdominanceleveragemakeuseofdebt in
expanding their production. Firms with strong proﬁtability and reserve
fundsandhigh marketdominanceadoptahigh-risk production strategy
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and use more debt. Thus, we can predict a cubic relationship between
capital structure and market power. In other words, ﬁrms at relatively
lower and higher levels of market power employ more debt, while ﬁrms
at the intermediate level of market dominance are vulnerable to rivals’
competitive threat and reduce their debt.
Conclusionand Recommendations
This study has empirically examined the relationship between capital
structureandmarketpowerusing datafor14Jordanianbanksforthe pe-
riod from 2005 to 2008. The study provides new insights into the way in
which the capital structure is measured by total debt-to-assets ratio and
market power. That is, at lower and higher ranges of Tobin’s Q, banks
employ higher debt, and reduce their debt at intermediate range. This is
due to the complex interaction of market conditions, agency costs, and
bankruptcy costs. We also show a saucer-shaped relation between cap-
ital structure and proﬁtability because of the interplay of agency costs,
costs of external ﬁnancing and interest tax-shield. In addition to the Q
ratio and proﬁtability, other independent variables are included in my
estimation. We ﬁnd that size and tangibility have a positive and growth
inﬂuence, while risk (systematic) and ownership have a negative inﬂu-
ence on capital structure.
Future research can be directed in several ways. First, we will address
the issue of dynamic estimation using system gmm to examine whether
or not the underlying dynamic structure aﬀects the ﬁndings. Second, we
will look into the diﬀerence between manufacturing industries and ser-
vices, since one can argue that ﬁrms in these sectors will react diﬀerently
to increasing bank market concentration. Third, we want to instrument
the bank market structure to explicitly account for potential endoge-
nously. Finally, we will investigate whether the ownership structure of
the ﬁrm has an impact on the relationship between bank market con-
centration and leverage
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